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In Memoriam

Ritual and Economy: From Mutual Embedding to Non-Profit Festivalisation in Provincial Hungary

Chris Hann

'No human beings, at whatever stage of culture, completely eliminate spiritual preoccupations from their economic concerns' (Malinowski 1935: xx). Drawing on the history and theory of economic anthropology from the pioneering investigations of Bronislaw Malinowski to the work of a post-doctoral research team at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (Halle/S) between 2009 and 2012, this paper[*] explores the interface between ritual and the economy in socialist and post-socialist Eastern Europe. The ruptures of early socialism gave way to a re-embedding of the economy that was especially dynamic in the sphere of the household. By contrast, post-socialist disembedding is proving harder to modify.

Key words: *(dis)enchantment, economic anthropology, embeddedness, Karl Polanyi, (post-)socialism, ritual*.

Pasirėmus ekonominės antropologijos istorija ir teorija – nuo novatoriškų Bronisławo Malinowskio tyrimų iki 2009–2012 m. Maxo Plancko socialinės antropologijos instituto (Halle/S) podaktarinės programos tyrėjų grupės parengtos studijos, – straipsnyje nagrinėjamas ryšys tarp ritualo ir ekonomikos socialistinėje ir posocialistinėje Rytų Europoje. Ankstyvojo socializmo raidos netolygumai davė pagrindą rastis naujam nesuprekintos ekonomikos etapui, pasižymėjusiam ypatingu dinamiškumu namų ūkio srityje. Kita vertus, posocialistinį ekonomikos suprekinimą yra sudėtingiau modifikuoti.

Raktiniai žodžiai: *(at)kerėjimas, ekonominė antropologija, ekonomikos nesuprekinimas, Karlas Polanyi, (po-)socializmas, ritualas.*

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Introduction: A Century of Economic Anthropology

Even before the sub-discipline of economic anthropology took shape under this name, the connections between ritual and economy were the subject of intense reflection by European scholars. Empirical investigations by ethnographers began in the early 20th century. The focus was on production, and more specifically, on how 'primitive' or 'savage' peoples could carry out the demanding physical tasks necessary for their survival. The inspirational figure was the German economic historian Karl Bücher, who answered this question by emphasising the importance of rhythm and song for easing the drudgery of physical labour (Bücher 1895; Bücher 1901). Bücher's lectures at the University of Leipzig were attended in 1909 by a young student from Cracow (at that time part of Austrian Galicia) called Bronislaw Malinowski, who took these questions with him when he moved to London to begin his career as an anthropologist.

Malinowski's answers came in two phases. In the first, he relied, like Bücher and other 'armchair' scholars of the age, on the data supplied by others. His contribution to the Festschrift for Edvard Westermarck in 1912 was a reassessment of the Intichiuma ceremonies of Aboriginal Australians (Malinowski 1993[1912]), a case previously explored by Émile Durkheim to theorise how ritual created the collective effervescence that forged the group. Whereas Bücher had drawn a distinction between contemporary industrial forms of work and 'pre-economic' work, Malinowski stressed that the organisation of elaborate ceremonies required careful preparation and the investment of a lot of effort. This work was accompanied and motivated by magic and ritual, but that did not make it any less economic; the two spheres functioned harmoniously (see Thornton, Skalnik 1993).

A few years later, Malinowski undertook the pioneering field research which made his name and launched the British School in social anthropology. The Trobriand Islands of Melanesia became famous for their participation in the elaborate inter-island ceremonial exchange system known as *kula*, the subject of Malinowski's first monograph (Malinowski 1922). In addition to coastal fishing, the Trobrianders were horticulturalists who produced most of their food supply by working hard in their yam gardens. Malinowski addressed this subject in the last and longest of his Trobriand monographs *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, arguably the supreme demonstration of his functionalist method (Malinowski 1935). The mature ethnographer is able to detail the magical formulae and rites, led by the 'garden magician', that are integral to the labour process (see Spittler 2008). Malinowski shows however, that magic is clearly distinguished by the natives from 'practical husbandry', in the sense of goal-directed, technically efficient labour. The two are inseparable, but are never confused (although they may

sometimes overlap). Rational efficiency is less important than aesthetic pleasure in cultivating the gardens like a 'work of art'. There is deep psychological satisfaction in the completion of challenging manual tasks. Malinowski does not use the term ritual, preferring to speak of rite, ceremony, magic and the spiritual. In his depiction, the Trobriand tribal economy epitomises what scholars a few years later began to label *embeddedness*. For example, beyond the belief system. a more concrete key to understanding the distribution of the yam harvest lay in competitive *urigubu* transfers shaped by complex matrilineal kinship obligations and political organisation.

Malinowski's monographs are widely regarded as classics of economic anthropology, even if this term was barely used until the 1940s, the decade of his death. The discipline was launched intellectually in a more coherent fashion by the seminal work of Karl Polanyi, whose 'substantivist' school denied the universality of the axioms of the mainstream economists. Instead, Polanyi and his followers insisted that alternative concepts and perspectives were necessary to understand and explain the 'embedded' economies of pre-industrial societies (Polanyi 2001[1944]; Polanyi, Arensberg, Pearson 1957). Only in contemporary 'market society' were the precepts of neoclassical economics appropriate, argued the substantivists. Although this school petered out in the late 1960s, anthropologists have continued to show through culturally oriented studies of the economy how factors such as religious beliefs and ritual practices shape economic behaviour. It has frequently been pointed out that Polanyi and his followers erred in leaving the analysis of modern economies to the economists, since even in the more extreme cases of 'market society', social and cultural factors remain important. The main thrust of anthropological research shifted imperceptibly from production to consumption, from the creation of goods to their later histories or 'biographies' in different value regimes (Appadurai 1986). Anthropologists joined economic sociologists and economists in pointing out that commoditised rituals such as Christmas gift-giving played an essential role in generating demand and macro-economic stability. The new science of marketing posited quasi-magical relations between the buyers of branded goods and their associated symbols and meanings. While workers in Fordist factories might be thoroughly alienated and deskilled, motivated solely by their monetary earnings, nonetheless advertisers could salvage some magical enchantment in the world of consumption (Ogilvy 1985).

Substantivist and culturalist approaches along these lines did not go unchallenged. Members of the 'formalist' school in economic anthropology tried to show that the undeniable diversion of significant resources to 'wasteful' ritual practices did not invalidate the application of rigorous economic models based on the maximisation of utility (Cancian 1965). In a similar fashion, by the end of

the century, adherents of the so-called 'new institutionalist' school were extending economic logic ever further, to explain why institutions such as *kula* should come into existence in the first place (Landa 1994). Critics in the culturalist tradition objected that such explanations were a monstrous form of reductionism (Gudeman 2008). The upshot is that economic anthropology nowadays is a fragmented, even polarised, field of research (Hann, Hart 2011).

Economy and Ritual: The Halle Project

A century after the pioneering studies of Bronislaw Malinowski, between 2009 and 2012, Stephen Gudeman and I led the Economy and Ritual Research Group, a team of post-doctoral researchers that investigated the links between the economy and ritual in six rural communities which until the 1990s had experienced varying forms of socialism. The case studies revealed considerable diversity in the entanglements of economy and ritual at the micro-level of society. Our researchers also had to take account of diverging historical experiences of socialism and post-socialism at regional, national and transnational levels. Our starting point was a puzzle in the emerging literature on post-socialism. Some scholars were arguing that in order to cope with the new uncertainties, households were spending larger sums on ritual activities in order to cement their links with kin, neighbours and friends (Werner 1997). By contrast, others found contrasting tendencies: the dislocation of post-socialism was so dramatic, and the material contraction so significant, that households no longer had the resources to support the ritual activities to which they had become accustomed (Creed 2002).

Stephen Gudeman's international reputation in economic anthropology is founded above all on his studies of what he calls the 'house economy' in Latin America (Panama and Colombia are the two main locations of his field research). It was very exciting for me to be able to collaborate with a specialist on transformations of the house(hold) economy in circumstances quite different from those that I knew in Eastern Europe. For Stephen, I think the fascination of the adventure was roughly comparable, since he had no previous experience of socialism and post-socialism. All six post-doctoral members of our group carried out fresh field research and disseminated their results in numerous workshops and conferences. The main outcomes were gathered in two collective volumes (Gudeman, Hann 2015a; Gudeman, Hann 2015b).

Starting from the premise that human livelihoods everywhere depend on social relationships (sociality), each individual project explored the rural sector of a post-socialist 'culture area' exposed abruptly to new forms of the market after 1990. We documented more or less entrepreneurial individuals, more or

less intact local communities, and more or less prosperous post-socialist states, including several that are now full members of the EU. Above all, we explored the renewed importance of the household in the wake of the dissolution of institutions of socialism. Sociality starts with the sociability of the house, which is exemplified in rituals. The word ritual has acquired an enormous semantic range since Malinowski's preference for magic and the spiritual. For example, it is commonly applied to performances, both religious and secular, designed to buttress the domination of particular elites in modern states. In our project, we decided to bracket public spheres of mass spectacle and macro-level power relations, and to concentrate instead on more intimate spheres of interaction at the micro-level of society, where anthropological methods confer unique advantages. Close attention to the principle of self-sufficiency, first elaborated by Aristotle, reveals that it gained significance in the aftermath of socialism. This is only to be expected when an established economic order collapses and the integument of society is threatened. The pattern can be illuminated by Karl Polanyi's original theory of Victorian 'market society' as the outcome of a unique 'disembedding' of the economy from society, the basis for what he termed the 'great transformation' (Polanyi 2001[1944]). The transition from socialism to more or less extreme versions of neoliberal capitalism gave Polanyi's theories a renewed relevance in his East European homeland (see Hann 2019).

The relation between the economy and ritual is a key aspect of economic embeddedness. We might conceive of a society in which a simple materialist calculus of human needs dictates every economic decision and no resources are allocated to unconnected activities. In such a secular society, disenchantment in the sense in which Max Weber used this term would be complete. But, as my epigraph from Malinowski proclaims, no such society exists; humans everywhere devote time and resources to other apparently superfluous behaviours, motivated by factors glossed by Malinowski as spiritual, and by Gudeman as ritual. This fact poses a challenge to standard economics and modernisation theories, according to which all such customs impede efficient action, the expansion of markets, and the exercise of free choice. Modernisation theorists tend to see ritual as an irrationality on the path to a liberal society. More technically, neoclassical economists claim that customs and ceremonies constitute a 'negative externality' which is likely to obstruct economic growth. Marxists are more likely to view them as a mystification supported by the expenditure of a surplus and justified by an ideology that entrenches class positions.

But ritual may also have positive spill-overs for the economy, e.g. through the employment it generates and the materials it requires, some of which are destroyed and must be replenished. Through the social relationships they generate, rituals can provide a framework of trust within which self-interested trade and

material acquisition may be more efficiently conducted. In the dialectical terms of Gudeman, ritual may transform market acts to mutuality through converting commodities and services to social transfers; equally, it can bring impersonal wealth to the space of personal interaction (Gudeman 2008). The distinction between economic and ritual activities becomes hard, if not impossible, to draw, just as Malinowski had found in Melanesia, where gardening operations were so closely bound to magic.

Post-socialist societies in Eurasia are, of course, highly secularised. They are unusual in the degree to which ordinary people have been exposed to conflicting ideologies and participated in the active construction and destruction of experiments such as scientific atheism and collective planning. Although all focused on sociality at the micro-level of interpersonal relations and the immediate community, our researchers engaged with the concept of ritual in a very broad way. They addressed topics such as everyday hospitality, village festivals, the religious calendar, weddings, class reunions, and the ceremonies of godparenthood. Common to all was a focus on the house(hold) as the primary locus of sociality. This perspective complicates the standard narrative of ritual decline associated with related assumptions of secularisation in industrial and post-industrial society. These assumptions have been increasingly criticised for the capitalist societies of the West, but they are equally questionable in the case of the state socialist societies of the 20th century. In capitalist societies, the market is the dominant form of integration; but in socialist economies redistribution through the plan is the dominant form of integration, and public rituals are conspicuous, e.g. to mark the Bolshevik revolution or the day of national liberation. Does this make socialist countries more like archetypal tribes, in which a chief redistributes goods in the course of elaborate rituals (the best known of which are the potlatch rituals of the northwest coast, famously discussed by Marcel Mauss in 1925) (Mauss 2016[1925])? This analogy is perhaps far-fetched, but the question remains: what kind of rituals and enchantment persisted, and what new forms of ritual were invented, in the industrialising economies of 'actually existing socialism'? And what lessons can we learn from post-socialist transformations? These were the larger questions behind the Halle project. Since rural Hungary was covered by a member of our team, Bea Vidacs, I did not carry out new field research myself within the framework of this project. In the following sections of this paper, I turn first to a general outline of the significance of ritual in the socialist and post-socialist eras, paying particular attention to the Hungarian case. I conclude with an ethnographic analysis of a particular form of annual ritual that bridges the socialist and post-socialist eras in the public sphere of a small town. Thirty years after Hungary's 'system change' to become a capitalist market society, I argue that, taken together with a sharp decline in ritual in the private,

household sphere, the rather modest levels of effervescence generated by this festival reflect the limited extent of economic re-embedding and a high degree of disenchantment.

Two Phases of Socialism: Disembedding and Successful Re-Embedding

Obviously, there is great diversity within the countries of the former Soviet bloc (not to mention countries such as Yugoslavia, which tried to develop a different model of socialism from that of Marxist-Leninist central planning, or China and Vietnam, which claim to be socialist even today). I find it nonetheless useful to distinguish an initial phase, following the revolution which brought socialists to power, from a later period of consolidation in which new challenges, political and economic, socio-cultural and ideological, had to be met. The timing of these phases varied from country to country, and sub-periods can be multiplied almost infinitely; but it suffices here to put forward these two ideal types.

In the first phase, it goes without saying that the new socialist authorities are concerned above all to institutionalise their power. They seek to implement their agenda on behalf of the working class, and to tackle the fundamental problems of economic backwardness that characterised almost all regions of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist world. After all, the revolutions took place not, as Marx and Engels had expected, in the most advanced capitalist states of Europe, but on the periphery. These latecomers to industrialisation were subjected to draconian measures of catching up, within an ideological framework premised on collective ownership of the means of production. Priority was given to the 'commanding heights' of the economy. The new industrial labour force could only be recruited from the peasant masses. Collectivisation of peasant farms was therefore imposed, more or less brutally, in almost all countries. The new rural institutions were deprived of investment, since resources had to be concentrated on urban industry, and on the production of goods to promote more production, rather than consumer goods. The factories were organised in ways that strongly resembled the new forms of capitalist mass production. Lenin was an admirer of the managerial principles espoused by Frederick Taylor, even though the implementation of Fordism and Taylorism in socialist conditions had many distinctive features.

What can we say about ritual in this first phase of socialism? Political life was, of course, highly ritualised from very early on. One thinks of the embalming of Lenin's body at the Kremlin, the invention of a new ritual calendar, including the massive parades to mark May Day and the anniversary of the October Revolution (Lane 1981). Less spectacularly, under the five-year plans, many aspects

of economic management acquired new frameworks of meaning through mass campaigns to promote 'socialist competition'. Labour was celebrated and exploited through the honouring of individual model workers, notably Stakhanov. In the countryside, too, new forms of ritual were introduced. The socialist institution of the House of Culture was introduced into even small settlements, and the new culture workers were charged with promoting the 'new Soviet man' (Donahoe, Habeck 2011). They sometimes did so through adapting traditional idioms, such as organising tours by celebrated poets to convey the propaganda of the regime in new socialist farms to Kirghiz ex-nomads (Coşkun 2015). Traditional religious practices were suppressed, and secular equivalents were promoted in their place. There were no Malinowskian anthropologists around to document this socialist modernisation drive, either in the towns or in the countryside. We know all too little about the extent to which the new ideology was internalised as a belief system and fulfilled the needs characterised by Malinowski as spiritual. What we do know from the studies of historians is that the costs of this transformation were extremely high. Economists continue to debate the strategy of breakneck industrialisation. Was the extraction of maximum 'surplus' from the rural sector necessary in order to launch industrialisation and thereby enable the USSR to fight successfully in the Second World War? Or was the strategy that brought such suffering to the population, starved of consumer goods and often literally starving, actually counter-productive in a narrowly economic calculus?

This phase could not be sustained. It was abandoned more or less everywhere in the Soviet bloc in the years that followed the death of Stalin in 1953, and especially after the famous speech by Khrushchev at the Party Congress of 1956. The transition was not sudden. Socialist economic planning continued to prioritise heavy industry. Millions of factory workers commuted from their old homes in the countryside due to the lack of investment in urban housing. But gradually, the Marxist-Leninist regimes realised that the proliferation of more or less spectacular rituals in the public sphere would not suffice to legitimise their rule. They also had to meet the consumer needs of their populations, in a context in which expectations were continuously rising, thanks to the emergence of the 'affluent society' in countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain. And so they began to build factories to produce consumer goods, including automobiles, and even to import luxury goods from abroad, to the extent that foreign currency reserves allowed. Some veteran communists were sceptical as new youth subcultures sought to emulate bourgeois fashions, but in the more reformist variants, sometimes glossed as 'market socialism', even decadent pop music was tolerated, and factories which had previously produced industrial chemicals began to manufacture cosmetics. We also find the socialist authorities taking a great

interest in pre-industrial folk culture, subsidising ethnographic research, organising folklore competitions, and marketing folk souvenirs to tourists (Kligman 1981). In Hungary, too, the authorities subsidised the folkloristic dimension by supporting new dance festivals to celebrate cultural forms that were rapidly disappearing (Taylor 2008). Glossy magazines were published to help the beneficiaries of market socialism to appropriate their standardised apartments, by adapting features of interior décor that were modelled on trends in the West (Fehérváry 2013). In these ways, elements of consumerist enchantment entered the socialist world. They were appreciated. But at the same time, they were commonly perceived as second best: Star cola was inferior to Coca Cola, the local pop musicians were never in the same league as the international trendsetters.

In this second, reformist phase of Marxist-Leninist socialism, the rituals of the secular public sphere are routinised and lose their potential to arouse and mobilise the masses. This does not mean they have no effect, or that participants and observers become uniformly cynical. Lane noted that the ritual commemoration of the Soviet victory in the Second World War was especially powerful (Lane 1981). When it became easier to undertake field research in the Houses of Culture after the end of socialism, anthropologists discovered that there were indeed elements of mere 'show' (*pokazhuka*). They did not discover much spirituality in this institution. But despite elements of distancing, and even cynicism, the preparations for a performance and the effervescence experienced on the stage left a profound mark on those (generally young people) taking part (Habeck 2014).

In most countries, there is little interference with the rituals of established faith communities in the second phase of socialism. Rituals may reappear in less colourful and conspicuous forms, harking back to earlier beliefs and practices that were suppressed in the first, post-revolutionary phase. Caroline Humphrey documented the persistence of Buddhist customs in a collective farm in southern Siberia in the 1960s. She also showed how the apparently rigid structures of central planning were modified, even subverted, as the local leaders negotiated their targets with external officials in order to maximise 'manipulable resources' (Humphrey 1983). These resources enabled farm managers to generate incomes for themselves that far exceeded those prescribed in the formal plan.

The private sphere showed increasing convergence with bourgeois forms, with families and households increasingly saving in order to be able to enjoy better holidays, or acquire a car or better housing. Accommodation and holidays still depended to a high degree on state redistribution, both local government and workplace, but the scope for private accumulation increased, and so, inevitably, did new forms of inequality. These differentiating factors were modified by small-scale rituals in the workplace, notably those associated with the brigade, which provided its members with a miniature *Gemeinschaft* in the new

industrial society. Birgit Müller has shown that brigade members in the former East Germany also socialised with each other outside the workplace, even though they were free to choose otherwise (Müller 2007). In the factories, Taylorist principles and extremely alienating labour processes continued unabated. Yet, at least compared with the era of Stakhanov, new spaces for rewarding sociality emerged. Elizabeth Dunn has described the customs of name-day celebrations in a provincial factory in Poland (Dunn 2004). Even in piece-rate systems, workers managed to find some space to exert some control over their labour and to smuggle items produced illicitly out of the factory for their private use. The 'homers' produced by workers in a tractor factory in Budapest were a meaningful source of transcendence in a labour process that was otherwise just as alienating as that of any capitalist factory (Haraszti 1978).

Not all sections of the population were equally disposed to embrace socialist wage labour. Gypsies in Hungary indulged in rituals of drinking and song, in order to hold on to what they valued most highly in their distinctive, non-proletarian identity (Stewart 1997). More generally, outside the factories of the socialist sector, in the 'second economy' or informal sector that emerged in the second phase of socialism, elaborate ritualised forms of mutual support evolved in order to compensate for the continuing inadequacies of central planning. In short, the socialist 'economy of shortage' (Kornai 1980; cf. Verdery 1996) was accompanied by a complex 'economy of favours' (Ledeneva 1998), of which the Russian *blat* is the best-known example. The two were tightly interlocked (Humphrey's analysis of manipulable resources, mentioned above, exemplified the tight links). Both had a ritual dimension. Participants in *blat* might sometimes ask themselves whether the money or service they offered a neighbour was a rational, instrumental act, or whether it was an expression of genuine friendship, cemented in recreational rituals at the dacha at summer weekends, bringing moments that were experienced as enchantment. For Western critics, such phenomena simply reflected the failures of central planning, and could be classified as corruption. But the participants might see things differently, especially when new rituals legitimate the transactions. The anthropologist is professionally committed to documenting and presenting these local understandings, rather than imposing foreign classifications.

Post-Socialism: Disembedding and a Failure to Re-Embed?

There is no room to survey all the complex interactions of ritual and the economy in the quarter of a century that has passed since the demise of the Soviet bloc. Anthropologists documented an explosion of magical practices in the chaos of 1990s Russia (Lindquist 2006). Neo-shamanism became attractive to

many even in Hungary (Kürti 2015). In addition to the revival of established faith communities, evangelical Protestantism made significant inroads in many countries (Wanner 1998). In my own work in Hungary, I have described the emergence of new rituals when the primary school was transferred to the Roman Catholic Church, which could offer greater financial stability than the state. The school year, formerly launched in the socialist House of Culture, was now inaugurated in the Catholic church. Teachers brought up and trained in a secular climate are nowadays obliged to lead daily prayers in classrooms with a crucifix on the wall (Hann 2015; Hann 2016).

But this is not to say that church attendance has increased significantly, or that children imbibe spirituality at their now-compulsory religious instruction lessons. The religious landscape in post-socialist Eastern Europe is uneven, but overt re-enchantment is rare outside small sectarian groups. Desecularisation is most visible in the renewed prominence of churches in the public sphere, where they are often associated with the national identity (Hann 2010). The abolition of socialist holidays left plenty of room in the calendar for new holidays oriented towards the nation. In Hungary, for example, the liberal revolution of 1848, not commemorated in the socialist decades, resumed its rightful place on 15 March. It was complemented by a new national holiday, 23 October, to commemorate the anti-socialist revolution of 1956. National holidays observed under socialism, notably Constitution Day on 20 August, had their venerable links to religious traditions reinforced.

But the visibility of religion and the generation of national sentiment in the public sphere do not necessarily connect with the level of the house(hold) and everyday coping strategies as socialist institutions were dismantled and millions of citizens found themselves unemployed. The popularity of mumming rituals in Bulgaria can be viewed as a collective ritual response to the experience of 'cultural dispossession,' but dispossession also assumes more mundane, literal forms (Creed 2011). The impact of 'shock therapy' ruptured many strands of the evolved 'economy of favours' of the socialist era, including its distinctive forms of sociality (often based on the brigade). It is not fanciful to compare the 1990s to the 1950s in terms of a general 'disembedding' of economic forms from their previous well-established social contexts. The key question was: would the capitalist market economy eventually stabilise sufficiently to ensure some form of re-embedding, analogous to the re-embedding of market socialism as described in the previous section?

The liberal promise was that re-embedding would follow the Western path of parliamentary democracy, civil society and the rule of law. Private property and the market were the cornerstones of economic transformation, and the ethos was supposed to be one of minimal state regulation and bureaucratic transparency.

In a climate of global neoliberalism, these expectations were never fulfilled. For the relations between ritual and economy that interest us here, the evident inability of post-socialist nation-states to live up to liberal ideals has had two outcomes. First, accentuated by the global financial crisis that began in 2007–2008, which further increased the strains on the post-socialist economies, policymakers placed ever more emphasis on the symbols and rituals of the nation. In some cases, notably that of Hungary, politicians and economic managers tried to counter the impact of transnational corporations through policies of economic nationalism. These contributed to the second significant outcome of the transition to market economy, namely the flourishing of new forms of informality (cronyism, corruption, etc). It was always going to be a challenge to persuade citizens with no experience of paying personal income tax to embrace new standards of fiscal propriety. But when they saw how those associated with the entrenched elites were able to line their own pockets, the moral foundations of the new regime evaporated. For example, it became routine to remunerate workers outside the formal payslip in a collusion that emulated the informal social contracts struck in the socialist decades. Workers accepted that their employers could hardly afford to pay them more if that meant a rising level of employer's contributions, and so the ritual of handing over a supplementary envelope on payday persisted. In short, the 'mafia state' (Magyar 2016) at the macro-level, suffused in nationalist rhetoric, coexisted with new forms of the 'economy of favours' (often grafted on to older forms) at the micro-level of everyday life (Henig, Makovicky 2017). The high rates of labour migration to Western Europe are the strongest evidence for disenchantment and the failure of post-socialist re-embedding.

Post-Socialist Provincial Hungary

I have done fieldwork in rural Hungary since the 1970s (Hann 1980; Hann 2015). The general trends in the village of Tázlár, located between the rivers Danube and Tisza, south of the capital Budapest, are similar to those documented by Bea Vidacs, a member of the Economy and Ritual team, for a village in the east close to the Romanian border. The house(hold) economy boomed in the last decades of socialism throughout the Hungarian countryside (see also Lampland 1995). Material prosperity was reflected in an efflorescence of ritual expenditure, above all large wedding parties. This exemplified what I term the socialist re-embedding of the economy. Tázlár was a product of capitalist under-development, and living conditions for the great majority of inhabitants were harsh. This village had no garden magicians analogous to those of the Trobriand Islands. Land was held as capitalist private property, not in a complex hierarchy of group relations determined primarily by kinship. The peasants did not sing songs to ease

the burden of labour. Yet there was labour cooperation at peak periods, as there had been in pre-socialist years, and this spilled over into many forms of sociality and conviviality outside the domain of production. The mutual aid groups, for example in the vineyards, especially at the harvest (*szüret*), were simultaneously ritual groups. The productive activity was accompanied throughout the day by commensality. I recall enjoying numerous such magical moments in the course of my first field research in 1976–1977.

These trends peaked across the country in the 1970s. In certain regions, a decline set in even before the collapse of socialism. In the 1990s, the rural economy fell into a steep decline as the socialist 'symbiosis' of collective sector and house (hold) was destroyed through decollectivisation. This accelerated the decline in ritual expenditure by households. As more and more Hungarians emigrated to Western Europe in search of work, villages were depopulated, and many young people did not bother to get married at all. Those who did organised a small celebration in an urban restaurant: the large wedding parties of the past, in which hundreds of villagers participated, became an increasingly distant memory.

Perhaps as a form of compensation for this decline in the household sphere, in some places rituals have experienced a remarkable efflorescence in the public sphere. In the village studied by Vidacs, a new festival was invented so that the pig killings that had formally combined economy and ritual in the household sphere now did so at the level of the community (Vidacs 2015). These festivals usually have some connection with a region (e.g. traditional Hungarian cattle on the Great Plain, paprika in the sunny south, fish soup in Baja, a small town on the Danube, etc; see Kürti 2011; Pusztai 2007). Obviously, not all settlements are equally successful in securing sponsorship for such ventures. In Tázlár, successive mayors contented themselves with village fetes in the summer, featuring sporting contests, gastronomic delights, and prizes awarded for the best wine of the year. These are popular occasions that strengthen bonds of community, even though the level of ritual effervescence is rather low (Hann 2016).

Let me turn now to consider a festival that is organised annually in a market town some 15 kilometres from the village of Tázlár. Vintage Days (Szüreti Napok) have been celebrated in Kiskunhalas since 1979, when the festival was initiated by a small group of workers at the State Farm. The farm was the largest employer in this town of 30,000 inhabitants, and bulk wine production was its most lucrative branch of production. Since many households also practised viticulture on a small scale, wine was a major element in the local economy. This town had no industry to speak of before the 1950s. By the late 1970s, many factories had opened, housing estates had been constructed, and most households had at least one member who worked for wages either at the State Farm or in socialist industry. The emergence of this festival, which within a few years

Figure 1. Poster for the 2017 Vintage Days festival, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

Figure 2 (below). The opening sports event, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

Figure 3. The Tázlár Women's Choir on stage, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

was being sponsored not just by the State Farm but by the full panoply of socialist institutions, including the Communist Party and its Youth League, must be understood in this context. The wine of this region of the Great Plain is not distinguished (in comparison with the 'noble' wines produced in many other regions of Hungary). Production declined steeply in the 1990s when the State Farm was liquidated. Without its support, few households were able to continue small-scale production. Kiskunhalas, like Tázlár, has been haemorrhaging population in the post-socialist decades. The entire region (indeed almost the entire Hungarian countryside) is firmly in the hands of the Fidesz Party, led by Viktor Orbán. But in spite of the diminished importance of wine, and the general economic decline, the festival that takes place each year on the second weekend of September is still a major cultural event in the calendar of the post-socialist town.

Szüreti Napok in Kiskunhalas in September 2017 followed a schedule almost unchanged from previous years (see Figure 1 for the full programme). It kicked off on Friday in the late afternoon with a run through the city streets (Figure 2). Prizes were awarded in various categories to elite athletes, but the

Figure 4. Stalls selling traditional Hungarian delicacies, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

Figure 5. Freshly harvested vegetables, fruit and spices are displayed and sold, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

Figure 6. Vintage cars attract much attention, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

vast majority of participants jogged a much shorter distance in a noisy, ebullient atmosphere. Most were school-age children. The proportion of older citizens was higher when the festival was formally opened a little later in the main square by a deputy mayor. Politics were not mentioned. The square was by no means full, and it occurred to me several times during the weekend that the decision to have three stages in close proximity was odd, since the audience was barely sufficient for one. The stage acts ranged from the Tázlár Women's Choir (Figure 3) to folk artists from several neighbouring countries. One smaller stage featured acts aimed at younger people, but it was not well attended. Local aerobics clubs and gymnasts were given their moment in the limelight. The evening programme in the main venue concluded with a DJ playing popular hits from earlier decades, national and international. In addition to the music, the streets surrounding the main square were given over to a few dozen stalls, at which craftsmen sold their wares, vintners their wine, and local entrepreneurs a range of other refreshments and food items (Figures 4 and 5).

The next day, Saturday, opened with a grand procession of vintners from the train station to the town centre. In addition to tractors and other agricultural vehicles, the colourful cavalcade featured vintage cars and motor cycles, not to mention the town's fire engines. The cars were later parked, to be admired by visitors (Figure 6). The event closed on Sunday afternoon with a performance

Figure 7. Top of the bill artist Éva Csepregi on stage on Sunday afternoon, September 1917 (photograph by Chris Hann).

by a pop star well known throughout the country as a member of the group known as Neoton, founded in the mid-1970s as the Hungarian answer to Abba (Figure 7). Éva Csepregi's music did not change significantly in her long career as a solo artist. Visitors could admire an exhibition in the Town Hall in which copies of all her records were displayed, surrounded by photographs from her glory days. The mood of nostalgia was palpable during her high-energy performance. But even though the alternative venues had closed by this point, the crowd on Sunday afternoon did not come close to filling the square; few young people were interested.

In conversations and later enquiries, I heard some praise for the event, especially for the invitation to Éva Csepregi (who turned out to be a personal acquaintance of the municipal official responsible for culture). But I also heard criticism. While the entertainment was free, the fact that one had to pay an entrance fee to enter a special 'nature park' for young children was said to be a significant dis-incentive to young families. There was also negative comment on the fact

that the only public lavatory in the central zone charged 100 forints (just over 30 cents). It was considered ridiculous that you were issued with a formal receipt in line with the regulations before being allowed in to pee. To taste the wines and sample the catering near the stages was also beyond the reach of many, who compared prices with the products they could buy far more cheaply down the road at a German-owned supermarket.

The organisational form differs from socialist days. Nowadays, Szüreti Napok is carried out under the patronage of a senior politician (in 2017, the deputy minister of agriculture, a member of the Fidesz Party), together with the recently established Kiskunhalas Foundation, members of which include a number of local businessmen, who provide some sponsorship. Most of the costs are borne by the municipality, but the actual execution is in the hands of Halasi Média és Kultúra, a 'non-profit' company owned by the town that is responsible for a gamut of events, large and small, in the local public sphere. Not all citizens find its activities transparent. People ask why significant economic inputs, such as the staging and equipment for the festival, should be put out to tender, when they might generate income for locals. The answer is, of course, that the non-profit company really has no alternative but to accept the lowest bid. It has to economise as best it can, in order to pay the wages of its own employees, which are not underwritten by the municipality. But this explanation is not altogether convincing. Some citizens suspect that the Fidesz Party, only in control of the Town Hall in Kiskunhalas since 2014, is distributing public resources according to principles of cronyism that have been well documented throughout the country in recent years.

Overall, it would seem that the Szüreti Napok festival in Kiskunhalas does not generate significant levels of ritual effervescence. It does little to cement social ties, perhaps less than when the ritual was introduced in socialist days, when alternative entertainment was more limited, and more people turned up to participate in low-cost commensality. In those days, the level of ritual activity in the sphere of the house(hold) was undoubtedly far higher than it is today, but those old enough to remember tend to say that there was also more conviviality when they came together in the public sphere. Their children may dismiss these memories as unwarranted nostalgia. In terms of substantive content, the programme of the festival in the 1980s, when organised by a plurality of socialist organisations, differed very little from the festival organised nowadays by the non-profit company.

Conclusions

Whereas Malinowskian anthropologists offered rich ethnographic accounts of how economy and ritual are thoroughly entangled in tribal contexts such as that of the Trobriands, the dominant narrative of Western social theory pulls them apart. Weber's metaphor of disenchantment is the most celebrated. In economic anthropology, Karl Polanyi's metaphor of the disembedded economy evokes a similar binary. The paper connects these metaphors, and proposes more dynamic applications of both.

Unilineal, teleological narratives of secularisation are particularly unhelpful in understanding 20th-century socialist societies. Beyond the orchestrated spectacles imposed by the state to cement the socialist belief system (and the power of the Communist Party), new forms of low-level enchantment emerged in even the most Fordist socialist factories, and, somewhat later, in a consumerist socialist urban society. The countryside followed a distinct path. Embedded rural economies were torn apart in the first phase of socialism, but they recovered strongly from the 1960s onwards. This re-embedding was reflected in the revival of ritual. This was most evident in the thick sociality of the private (household) sphere, but new initiatives (often celebrations of the pre-industrial folk culture in which the expertise of ethnographers was called upon) were also undertaken in the public sphere, especially in larger settlements.

Relations between ritual and economy in the post-socialist era have taken quite different forms. As was foreseen in the liberal blueprint of a rational social order regulated by law and the market, the space for ritual activities has declined significantly. The provinces as a whole have been devastated. In the era of neoliberal capitalism, sociality has become thin in comparison with the larger networks and the more intense emotions of the past. Because some goods were always scarce under socialism, even in the more successful variants such as the Hungarian, the realm of consumption, broadly understood, usually had elements of surprise, thrill, and even magic. This has weakened significantly in the market society of today. If people have the money, they can be sure of meeting their everyday needs in a local supermarket such as Pennymarkt or Lidl. Compared to traditional pig-sticking, there is little enchantment in purchasing meat or sausage from one of these German chains that have built up their business through opposing the mystique of brands, and emphasising instead just their low prices. The Hungarian socio-economy has been as thoroughly disembedded in the last 25 years as it was in the first phase of socialism. Although the anomie of the market can hardly be compared with Stalinist repression, some of the consequences seem similarly negative. There is at present little sign that a more positive phase of re-embedding will follow, comparable to that which occurred under

socialism. Public festivals such as the wine festival (Szüreti Napok) in the market town of Kiskunhalas, which emerged 'from below' in the late socialist era, have persisted, and in many locations new festivals have been invented. These typically provide a weekend of entertainment and distraction for sections of the urban population, but they hardly compensate for the loss of dynamism in which, for households, ritual and economic energies were thoroughly fused. The official message today is that, to conform to EU norms, ritual and economy must be strictly separated, and every transaction transparently documented. Yet there is a fear that, behind this new rhetoric and the 'non-profit' construction of the festival organisation, new forms of corruption are flourishing, forms that, compared to socialism, bring massive profits to a select few.

The consequence of the current configuration is that, for many disaffected citizens, only rituals and emotions that connect with their national identity provide a satisfactory space of refuge. This is the syndrome fuelling the malignant xenophobia which secures Viktor Orbán easy re-election, but makes his country a pariah in the contemporary European Union.

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Ritualas ir ekonomika: nuo abipusės nesuprekintos ekonomikos iki nevyriausybinės festivalizacijos provincinėje Vengrijoje

Chris Hann

Santrauka

Antropologai jau seniai domisi ryšiu tarp ekonomikos ir ritualo, pradedant novatoriškais Bronisławo Malinowskio tyrimais, skirtais santykiui tarp produktyvios veiklos ir magijos atskleisti, baigiant neseniai 2009–2012 m. parengta Maxo Plancko socialinės antropologijos instituto (Halle/S) podaktarinės programos tyrimų grupės studija, kurioje tyrinėjamas posocialistines transformacijas išgyvenančių kaimo bendruomenių prisitaikymas mikro lygmenyje. Malinowskis pasiūlė taiklią etnografinę Trobriando salų, kur ekonomika ir magija, nors ir egzistuoja atskirai, yra visiškai susipynusios, analizę. Priešingai, Vakarų socialinėje teorijoje vyraujantis naratyvas šias kategorijas atskiria. Weberio pasiūlyta (at)kerėjimo (*(dis)enchantment)* metafora išlieka populiari, o ekonominėje antropologijoje panašiu binariniu požymiu pasižymi Karlo Polanyi ekonomikos „suprekinimo" metafora ir iš to kylanti „didžioji transformacija". Šiame straipsnyje analizuojamas binariškumas tampa sudėtingesnis, kai siekiama ištirti santykį tarp tokių sąvokų kaip (at)kerėjimas ir ekonomikos suprekinimas socialistinėje ir posocialistinėje Rytų Europoje.

Vienašališki teleologiniai naratyvai netinka mėginant suprasti oficialiai ateistines ir ypač sekuliarizuotas socialistines 20 a. visuomenes. Už gerai surežisuotų reginių, kurių valstybė griebėsi siekdama įtvirtinti marksistinę-lenininę ideologiją (ir Komunistų partijos galią), net ir fordizmą išpažinusiose socialistinėse gamyklose pradėjo atsirasti naujų neryškių apžavų formų. Kiek vėliau, jau po Stalino, išdygo pirmieji vartotojiškos socialistinės miesto visuomenės daigai. Kaimas pasuko kitu keliu. Nesuprekinta kaimo ekonomika, suskaidyta pirmajame socializmo etape, po 1960 m. ėmė pastebimai atsigauti. Tai buvo ypač akivaizdu privačioje (namų ūkio) socialinės sferos srityje. Tačiau ir viešajai erdvei netrūko naujų iniciatyvų (dažnai rengtos ikiindustrinės liaudies kultūros šventės, kur buvo pasitelkta etnografų patirtis). Straipsnyje, pasirėmus Vengrijos atveju, teigiama, kad ankstyvojo socializmo (septintojo dešimtmečio) raidos netolygumai buvo panašūs į tą ekonomikos suprekinimo formą, kurią tyrė Polanyi 19 a. *laissez-faire* Didžiojoje Britanijoje. 1980–1990 m. politikai stabilizuojantis ir vykstant į rinką orientuotoms ekonominėms reformoms, prasidėjo ekonomikos nesuprekinimas. Šis procesas buvo ypač dinamiškas namų ūkio srityje ir labiausiai pastebimas padidėjus ritualams skirtoms išlaidoms.

Socialistinių režimų žlugimas 1989–1993 m. ir jų pakeitimas naujomis rinkos formomis eroje, kai ideologiškai ir geopolitiškai vyravo neoliberalizmas, yra dar vienas ekonomikos suprekinimo pavyzdys, labai panašus į Polanyi liberalizmą Viktorijos laikų Britanijoje. Ritualinės veiklos erdvė labai susitraukė. Provincijos buvo nuniokotos; palyginti su anksčiau egzistavusiais didesniais tinklais ir praeities stipresnėmis emocijomis, ypač sunyko socializacija. Kadangi socializmo laikais kai kurių prekių kiekis visada buvo ribotas, net ir tokiose sėkmingiau besiplėtojančiose valstybėse, kaip kad Vengrija, vartojimo sričiai plačiąja prasme paprastai buvo būdingi staigmenos, jaudulio ir net magijos elementai. Jie susilpnėjo šių dienų rinkos visuomenėje, kai daugumą pagrindinių poreikių galima lengvai patenkinti tokiuose prekybos centruose kaip „Pennymarkt“ ar „Lidl“. Palyginti su tradicine kiaulių medžiokle, mažai liko apžavėjimo elementų perkant mėsą ar dešreles viename iš šių Vokietijos prekybos centro tinklų, sukūrusių verslą priešinantis prekės ženklų mistikai ir pabrėžiant vien tik žemą prekių kainą. Nors rinkos *anomie* sunku būtų lyginti su stalinizmo represijomis, kai kurios iš naujausių sisteminių pokyčių pasekmių yra tokios pat neigiamos. Žiūrint kaimo ir provincinių miestelių gyventojų, turinčių ypač nedaug galimybių įsidarbinti, o jų šeimos nariams dėl darbo migracijos išsisklaidžius po šalį požiūriu, posocialistinis ekonomikos suprekinimas yra nuolatinė būklė. Todėl neliko vėlyvojo socialistinio laikotarpio namų ritualų entuziazmo.

Nors daugelį valstybinių mokyklų vėl kontroliavo bažnyčia, tai neatvedė prie naujo materialinės ekonomikos susireguliavimo. Naujosios šventės, skirtos vietinių produktų reklamai, taip pat veikia ribotai. Straipsnyje nenagrinėjama,

kokiu mastu socialistinių herojų ir viešųjų festivalių pakeitimas naujuoju nacionaliniu panteonu ir ritualiniu kalendoriumi makro lygmenyje turi įtakos piliečių identifikacijai. Tačiau viena iš tikėtinų dabartinių pokyčių pasekmių, paliekančių ypač mažai apžavėjimo elementų namų ūkyje, yra ta, kad daugeliui nepatenkintų piliečių patenkinamu kolektyvinio identiteto šaltiniu (ar prieglobsčiu) yra tik ritualai ir emocijos, kurie sieja juos su tauta. Tai sindromas, kuris leidžia plisti piktybinei ksenofobijai ir kuris užtikrina Viktoro Orbáno lengvą perrinkimą; tuo pačiu jis Vengriją paverčia nepageidaujama šiandieninėje Europos Sąjungoje.

Straipsnis baigiamas trumpu etnografiniu pasakojimu apie kasmetinę turgaus šventę Alfelde, Vengrijoje, kuri patenka tarp makro ir mikro lygmens. Šiandien šventę, kurią kolūkiečiai pradėjo organizuoti vėlyvojo socializmo epochoje kaip vietos bendruomenės gajumo išraišką, papildančią namų ūkių gyvastingumą, savivaldybės vardu organizuoja pelno nesiekianti įmonė, privalanti laikytis griežtų neoliberalios ekonomikos principų.

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